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Abstract 
 
During the Second World War, millions of Jews died as the Nazis expanded their 
power and harsh racial ideology across Europe.  As countries fell under Nazi occupation, 
the civil and human rights of their Jewish citizens were obliterated and many Jews were 
deported to camps where they most often perished.  However, Denmark was an 
exception.  In October 1943, when, after three years of occupation as a model 
protectorate, news leaked of an upcoming mass deportation of Denmark’s Jews, the 
Danes carried out a rescue operation.  By hiding and then taking them by boat to neutral 
Sweden, they saved about 7,000 of the country’s estimated 7,500 Jewish citizens.  With 
just a few days’ notice, the Danes were able to foil a plan that took the Germans a month 
to create.   
This result gave rise to a theory conceived by some historians known as the ‘Good 
Germans’ Theory.  It holds that the deportation in Denmark was initiated and then 
deliberately sabotaged by the local German administration.  These officials, most notably 
the German plenipotentiary, Werner Best, and a maritime attaché, Georg Duckwitz, took 
action to alert the Jewish community about the deportation order and then carried out the 
operation in a way that essentially ensured it would be ineffective. The implication of the 
theory is that there was some moral imperative driving the actions taken by these 
Germans.  
This thesis explores the ‘Good Germans’ Theory and examines the role played by 
the German leaders and soldiers in the history of the Danish rescue.  It presents evidence 
to suggest that while the actions of the Germans were “good” because they allowed for a 
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rescue of the Danish Jews to succeed, they were likely motivated much more by political 
and personal considerations.   
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Chapter I 
“On principle we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a peaceful 
occupation.”1 
 
On the afternoon of September 29, 1943, Herbert Pundik’s childhood ended.  On 
that day, his school’s headmaster dismissed sixteen-year-old Pundik and his fellow 
Jewish classmates after he learned about the upcoming deportation of Danish Jews.  
Pundik rushed home and when he arrived, he found his parents and siblings already 
packed to leave; his father had learned of the news earlier in the day from a friend who 
attended morning service at the synagogue and heard the rabbi’s warning of impending 
danger.  The warning, although appreciated, sent Copenhagen’s Jewish population into a 
panic.  According to an excerpt from a young Danish girl’s unpublished diary: “But today 
it is different.  Today you are a refugee.  The quiet days, they finished yesterday.  When 
the message came, anxiety rose in your body, replacing the blood in your veins.  You go 
out on the street, watching to see if anyone follows you.  Yesterday it would have looked 
strange, a bit silly.  Today your life is at stake.”2  After leaving Copenhagen, the Pundik 
family was hidden in a fisherman’s cottage along the coast and waited for their turn to be 
ferried over to neutral Sweden.  While they waited, German patrols increased in the area 
with the help of a Danish informant and search dogs.  Every knock on their host’s door 
brought intense fear to everyone involved.  About four days later, on the night of October 
3, the family was finally able to cross the Øresund Strait to Sweden.  Of this experience, 
                                                
1 Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. “C-174 
Hitler Order for operation “Weseruebung,” 1 March 1940,” Aggression Against Norway and 
Denmark, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 1 (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1946), 745. 
2 Quoted in Herbert Pundik, “Personal Narrative: Herbert Pundik,” in The Rescue of the 
Danish Jews: Moral Courage Under Stress, ed. Leo Goldberger (New York: New York 
University Press, 1987), 84. 
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Pundik recalls the sound of the boat cutting through the water, the fisherman’s 
determination to reach the coast as quickly as possible, and the German patrol boats’ 
searchlights in the sky.3  Although he remembered the events as the unhappy end of his 
childhood, Pundik attributed the success of his family’s dangerous and terrifying journey 
to the bravery, quick thinking, and fast work of many of their fellow Danes.   
Hanne Goldstein and her young family also needed to flee occupied Denmark. 
For Goldstein, the advance notice had come directly from a frequent customer of her 
brother-in-law’s tailor shop: the wife of a German trade official.  Although he did not 
believe the threat was real, her husband’s employer at a manufacturing firm agreed to 
help the young family and supplied them with safe housing in Sjælland.  After hiding for 
weeks in the rural countryside, the family was arranged passage to Sweden through the 
resistance movement.  But first they had to return to Copenhagen.  This became difficult, 
as train conductors were now fearful of passengers being inspected by Germans and 
sometimes refused Jewish riders.  It was only after a resistance member held a pistol to a 
reluctant conductor’s head that they were allowed to hide in the baggage car.  At the 
Copenhagen train station waiting for further transportation to the north coast, the 
Goldstein family encountered a group of German soldiers on the platform.  Goldstein 
panicked; to observers it was obvious that the family was Jewish and running from the 
Nazis’ orders.  However, unlike the experience of many other Jews who fled their 
occupied homelands, when these soldiers confronted them, they not only spared her 
family but also began to play with her two young children.  According to Goldstein, 
because they were regular soldiers – not Gestapo – they expressed no interest in 
                                                
3 Ibid. 77 & 90. 
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apprehending them. 4   The Goldsteins would reach the north coast of Denmark and 
Sweden safely because of the intervention of both Danes and Germans.  
 
Three years before, in the early morning hours of April 9, 1940, Germany 
launched ‘Weseruebung’, their code name for the invasion of Norway (‘Weseruebung 
Nord’) and Denmark (‘Weseruebung Sued’).5  The attack had been long-expected among 
many in Denmark’s political and military circles; since January 1940, both Danish and 
Norwegian governments were repeatedly advised by their delegations in Berlin that the 
Germans were planning a military action in Scandinavia.6  According to Hitler’s orders 
for the invasion, “On principle we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a 
peaceful occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the 
Scandinavian States.”7  The appearance of a “peaceful occupation” was necessary, as 
Germany and Denmark had just signed a Treaty of Non-Aggression the year before.  
Instead of invading for the sake of bringing another country under Nazi control, Germany 
claimed its reason was to help the Scandinavian countries remain neutral and away from 
British control.   
At 4:00 am, the German ambassador to Denmark, Cecil von Renthe-Fink, called 
the Danish Foreign Minister, Peter Munch, to notify him that German troops at that very 
moment were moving in to occupy Denmark.  Renthe-Fink presented Munch with an 
                                                
4 Andrew Buckser, "Modern Identities and the Creation of History: Stories of Rescue 
Among the Jews of Denmark," Anthropological Quarterly 72, no. 1 (1999): 7. 
5 Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. “C-174,” 
736, 746. 
6 Gunnar Leistikow, "Denmark Under the Nazi Heel," Foreign Affairs, 21, no. 2 (1943): 
342.  
7 Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. “C-174,” 
745. 
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ultimatum: submit peacefully and a hostile occupation would be avoided.  Germany was 
more interested in controlling Denmark’s western coast than in forcefully governing 
another country.  In return for the Danes preventing any further resistance during the 
occupation, Germany would not interfere with Denmark’s internal government while 
guaranteeing their political independence by “protecting” Denmark’s neutrality against 
British influence.8  A meeting between Denmark’s King Christian X, Munch, and other 
senior cabinet and military officials was quickly convened.  As German naval and aircraft 
approached, Denmark, a country with no natural barriers to hold off its attackers and a 
small military, surrendered and agreed to Germany’s terms of occupation.  By 6:00 am, 
within two hours of invasion, Denmark was under Nazi control. 
At the time of the German invasion in April 1940, the Jewish population in 
Denmark was approximately 7,500.  More than 95% Of Denmark’s Jewish citizens lived 
in Copenhagen, where they made up 1% of the city’s population.  By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Jewish communities outside of Copenhagen virtually ceased to exist as 
the younger generations moved to the city. 9  Since then, Copenhagen had become a 
center for Jewish life and culture.  Among the Jewish community’s institutions included a 
school, nursing homes, day care centers, restaurants and cafes, two cemeteries, and a 
large administration building near the palace.10  The Great Synagogue of Copenhagen, 
located in the center of the city, was erected in 1833 and celebrated its one hundredth 
                                                
8 Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, “D-628 
Memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude towards Denmark before and during occupation,” 
Aggression Against Norway and Denmark, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 1 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 752. 
9 American Jewish Committee, The Jewish Communities of Nazi-Occupied Europe, (New 
York: Howard Fertig, 1982). 
10 Andrew Buckser, “Religious Practice and Cultural Politics in Jewish Copenhagen,” 
American Ethnologist 30 (2003): 103-104. 
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anniversary in 1933 with a ceremony attended by Denmark’s King Christian X.  
However, while most Danish Jews in the twentieth century were deeply integrated into 
the secular community, there were divisions in the Jewish community itself that helped 
shape their religious identity.  
Within Denmark’s Jewish population there were two very different groups of 
immigrants that were influential in their community.  In the 1790s, the arrival of Jewish 
merchants from Germany created a Jewish community that was educated, affluent, and 
constituted the dominant religious force in the nineteenth century.11  These German, or 
“Viking,” Jews were easily assimilated into Danish society.  They spoke the Danish 
language, had small families, were politically conservative, and fairly wealthy.12  In the 
early twentieth century, a new wave of immigrants came from Eastern Europe that were 
deeply rooted in Jewish tradition and usually impoverished.  This group of Jewish 
immigrants had a difficult time assimilating to secular Danish society: they mainly spoke 
Yiddish, wore different clothing, had large families, and worked as lower-class 
tradesmen.  Although the immigrants from Eastern Europe made up the majority of the 
Jewish population by 1940, it was the Viking Jews’ assimilated lifestyle that helped them 
maintain power in the Jewish community.13  Their influence encouraged Jewish Danes to 
think of themselves as Danish citizens first and as Jews second.     
The majority of Denmark’s citizens held loyal feelings towards their Jewish 
neighbors.  After seeing the repercussions of The Night of Broken Glass, Kristallnacht, in 
Germany, the Danish government amended the Criminal Law of 1939 to include a 
                                                
11 Buckser, “Religious Practice and Cultural Politics in Jewish Copenhagen,” 104. 
12 Andrew Buckser, "Group Identities and the Construction of the 1943 Rescue of the 
Danish Jews," Ethnology 37, no. 3 (1998): 216. 
13 Ibid.  
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provision that would imprison anyone who was slanderous to another on the basis of 
religion, origin, or citizenship.14  Because of this and hearing of the actions and policies 
of the Nazi government, such as the belief in Germans’ genetic superiority and destiny to 
expand, the Danish people developed an increasingly negative view of the Nazis and their 
German sympathizers.  For example, Helen Lang, a Holocaust survivor originally from 
Czechoslovakia, was eventually brought to Denmark by SS doctors while she was posing 
as a Hungarian gentile.  While still maintaining her disguise, Lang went into the city to 
see if any Jews remained in Denmark.  However, because she only spoke German and 
used German money, the Danes refused to help her; “And here I was afraid to tell ‘em I 
am Jewish… That was my mistake because after I heard that the Denmarks [sic] – how 
good they were to Jews”.15  There is no evidence that any inherent anti-Semitism existed 
in Denmark before the war.  The Nazi organizations that were formed in Denmark in the 
1930s consisted mainly of Danes with German ancestry from Slesvig, the Danish name 
for the German town of Schleswig.16  The Danish Nazi Party was never a popular 
movement and its leader, Frits Clausen, continuously failed to win government elections.        
Hitler considered the Nordic countries to share similar Aryan origins with 
Germany and should therefore be treated as allies.  Ethan Hollander, a political science 
professor who studies nationalism and ethnic conflict, claims, “To that end, the invasion 
and occupation were to be undertaken not with an iron fist but with a velvet glove.”17  For 
                                                
14 Myrna Goodman, “Foundations of Resistance in German-Occupied Denmark,” in 
Resisting the Holocaust, ed. Ruby Rohrlich (Oxford: Berg, 1998): 216. 
15 Helen Lang, interview by Dr. Sidney Bolkosky, University of Michigan-Dearborn 
Voice/Vision Holocaust Survivor Oral History Archive, February 23, 1982. 
16 American Jewish Committee, The Jewish Communities of Nazi-Occupied Europe, 
(New York: Howard Fertig, 1982). 
17 Ethan J. Hollander, "The Banality of Goodness: Collaboration and Compromise in the 
Rescue of Denmark's Jews," Journal of Jewish Identities 6, no. 2 (2013): 44.  
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the first three years of Denmark’s occupation, Danish politicians exercised a policy of 
negotiation and accommodation to prevent any open action against its Jewish citizens.  
According to Pundik, “Hitler was ready to grant the Danes this wide authority of self-rule 
as long as they prevented the anti-Nazi underground from getting out of hand, and 
continued to produce agricultural and industrial products.”18  However, this changed in 
1943 after an increase in Danish resistance sabotage efforts.  In response, Germany 
issued new demands, including that Danish saboteurs be tried by German military courts.  
Unable and unwilling to accept their demands, the Danish government resigned on 
August 28 and the Germans imposed martial law the next day.   
It was during this time that the Nazis decided to finally take action in making their 
Aryan ally Judenrein, or free of Jews.  It was decided that a mass roundup of Jews in 
Copenhagen would take place on the night of October 1-2, when families would be at 
home celebrating the Jewish holiday.  They would then be deported and taken to the 
Theresienstadt concentration camp in Czechoslovakia.  On September 28, Georg 
Ferdinand Duckwitz, a German maritime attaché in Copenhagen, learned the confirmed 
date of the mass deportation and passed along information to leaders of the Jewish 
community, who then warned their congregations the following day.  Duckwitz is also 
credited with negotiating with the Swedish government to accept Denmark’s refugees.  
Once the news spread, the Danish people sprung into action to help their Jewish 
neighbors.  Friends, family, and strangers alike were hidden and transported to the coast 
where they were then smuggled into Sweden in fishing boats.  While estimates vary 
slightly, approximately 7,000 Danish Jews were ferried from Copenhagen to neutral 
                                                
18 Pundik, “Personal Narrative: Herbert Pundik,” 78. 
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Sweden within a couple of weeks.  The number of Danish Jews arrested was under five 
hundred and the number of those who died in the Holocaust was less then two hundred. 
The German occupation of Denmark during World War II resulted in an 
impressive act of resistance during a time when collaboration was more common.  The 
sheer number and high degree of success of these rescues indicate the uniqueness of the 
occupation experience in Denmark.  As seen in the previous examples, there is no 
singular description of the events that remains true for everyone.  These two individual 
accounts of the rescues that took place in Denmark during October 1943 illustrate two 
different portrayals of the occupying Germans.  As a teenager at the time, Pundik was 
able to understand the dangers facing him and his family.  He appreciated the risks that 
other people – specifically Danes – took to protect them: the headmaster’s quick warning, 
the fisherman who opened his cottage to hide the family, and the fisherman who worked 
as quickly as possible to get them to safety.  In his story, the Danes were the true heroes 
and the Germans were more obviously the villains.  
For Goldstein, however, the Germans in her experience were not all cruel 
monsters.  For example, the warning about the deportation came indirectly from a 
German official and she described her family’s encounter with the German soldiers at the 
train station as “…young men far from home, more interested in playing with a pair of 
toddlers than in persecuting Jews.”19  Both families endured the dangerous journey of 
leaving their homes, going into hiding, and escaping Nazi-occupied Denmark by boat, 
but with very different experiences at the hands of the Germans.  
 
  
                                                
19 Buckser, "Modern Identities and the Creation of History,” 8. 
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Chapter II 
 
“The canary bird of a murderer.”20 
 
Hitler had special plans for Denmark.  He regarded Denmark as a fellow Aryan 
nation that shared its Nordic roots with Germany.  According to Nazi ideology’s scale of 
racial standing, the Aryan race represented by the German elite was superior.  The Nordic 
race was a close second and “the most authoritative dogmatists [including Nazi Party 
ideologist Alfred Rosenberg and Joseph Goebbels] of the Nazi creed have repeatedly 
pointed to Scandinavia as the true home of the glorious Nordic race.”21  In addition, 
Hitler also believed specifically that the peninsula that makes up the majority of 
Denmark, the Jutland, was mythically the ancestral home of the Nordic race.22  Denmark 
would therefore not be treated like another conquered country but as an ally.  Instead, it 
would be a model protectorate with its own internal government and small military yet 
remain under German protection when it came to foreign policy.  It would serve as a 
“showpiece” for what was to come in the Nazis’ new world order.23    
The occupying German government took cautious measures in dealing with their 
Danish counterparts.  By treating Denmark with a “velvet glove,” Germany would show 
the world that it knew “how to be generous to a conquered country.”24  Compared to its 
other conquered territories, Germany needed very few people to govern Denmark.  For 
example, to control Norway’s 2.8 million citizens, a German administrative force of 
                                                
20 Leistikow, 345. 
21 Joachim Joesten, “The Nazis in Scandinavia,” Foreign Affairs 15, no. 4 (1937): 720. 
22 Saul S. Friedman, A History of the Holocaust (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2004), 
318. 
23 Buckser, "Group Identities and the Construction of the 1943 Rescue of the Danish 
Jews," 211. 
24 Mordecai Paldiel, Diplomat Heroes of the Holocaust (Jersey City: KTAV Publishing 
House, Inc., 2007), 89. 
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3,000 people was required and often proved insufficient.  In Denmark there was a 
German diplomatic administration of just 100-200 people for 4 million Danes.25  To head 
this administration, the Reich’s Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop appointed 
Cecil von Renthe-Fink, a career diplomat who had served as the German ambassador in 
Denmark since 1936, as the chief representative of Nazi interests.  In doing so, he did not 
install a completely new German administration in Denmark but rather utilized German 
officials who were already known to the Danes.26   
Although the Danish government did not show much enthusiasm for working 
with the Germans, they arranged a policy of negotiation that benefited both countries.  
Unlike some of the other countries under German control, the willingness of Danish 
leaders to cooperate peacefully with the occupying Germans “gained for Danish citizens 
(temporarily, at least) a gentler German occupation – one that softened (but did not 
eliminate) the harsh impact of Nazi policy for nearly everyone in Denmark, Jewish or 
otherwise.”27  A moderate form of press censorship was introduced, a few politicians lost 
their jobs due to their anti-German attitudes, and the Wehrmacht appointed a new police 
minister to their liking.  Denmark also had to cut its diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union and was pressured in 1941 to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was a treaty 
that bound its members “in an international struggle against communism.”28  However, 
these forced concessions were relatively minor and mostly symbolic.  
Denmark also benefitted from the cooperative relationship between the two 
countries.  Aside from the strategic access they now had to the Baltic Sea, Denmark was 
                                                
25 Hollander, 46. 
26 Ibid. 45. 
27 Ibid. 42. 
28 Ibid. 46. 
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also a rich source of agricultural product for the Germans.  Danish records indicated that 
“3.6 million Germans received their meat, pork, and butter rations from Denmark in 
1942, 4.6 million in 1943, and 8.4 million in 1944.”29  German authorities, including 
Renthe-Fink, knew that in order to maintain the supply of Danish agricultural resources 
in the quantities needed to support the German population in wartime conditions, they 
needed to allow Denmark a certain amount of independence.  Because of this, the 
German occupation’s presence in Denmark was lighter than in most other occupied 
countries.  German soldiers stationed in Denmark called it “the Whipped Cream Front,” 
suggesting it was a much easier and enjoyable assignment than fighting on the other 
fronts.30  Danish citizens found the Wehrmacht soldiers sent to Denmark to be a more 
lenient occupation force than those sent to occupy most other countries in Europe.   Many 
of these soldiers were older men in their forties and fifties and did not place as much 
conviction in Hitler’s plans for the Third Reich as the younger generation did.  German 
soldiers wounded on the Eastern Front were also sent to Denmark in order to recuperate 
while being tasked with easier jobs.31  For many Danes, their German occupiers would 
not be a problem. 
Perhaps most significant in their lenient behavior was the fact that German 
officials did not press the issue of the Jewish population in Denmark.  In other occupied 
countries, a German administration governed the nation and implemented Nazi racial 
policies and restricted the rights of the country’s citizens.  For example, immediately 
                                                
29 Leni Yahil, The Rescue of Danish Jewry: Test of a Democracy, trans. Morris Gradel 
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1969), 117-118. 
30 Philip Hoose, The Boys Who Challenged Hitler: Knud Pedersen and the Churchill 
Club (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2015), 26. 
31 Emmy E. Werner, A Conspiracy of Decency: The Rescue of the Danish Jews During 
World War II (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 171. 
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after the occupation of Belgium in May 1940 – just one month after Germany invaded 
Denmark – the Nazis instituted harsh anti-Semitic laws that restricted the rights of 
Belgian Jews, confiscated their property, and forced them to wear a yellow Star of David.  
In the Netherlands, Jewish citizens were segregated from the gentile population, required 
to register themselves as Jewish, forced to wear the Star of David on their clothing, and 
were sent to concentration camps.  However, none of these actions were taken against the 
Jews of Denmark.   
Before the war, the Danish authorities did not view their Jewish citizens as a 
domestic problem.  This changed only with the occupation, when, according to historian 
Leni Yahil, “the Jewish question became a kind of symbol, a barometer of principle in 
theory and practice.”32  The occupying German government acknowledged the 
importance of this new concern for the Danish community and its leaders.  As early as 
April 15, 1940 – only six days after the invasion – Renthe-Fink sent a report to 
Ribbentrop’s Foreign Ministry that said: 
The Danish authorities are apprehensive as to whether we will, for all that, show 
too much interest in the internal situation and take steps against the Jews… and 
create a special police organ to this end.  If we do anything more in this respect 
than is strictly necessary, this will cause paralysis of or serious disturbances in 
political and economic life.  The importance of the problem should not therefore 
be underestimated.33  
 
From this point on, Renthe-Fink would continue to play a crucial role in protecting the 
rights of Danish Jews.  When the SS-Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler visited Copenhagen 
in 1941, Renthe-Fink met with him privately to discuss the Jews in Denmark.  He told 
Himmler that, while the already limited influence of Danish Jews had started to decline, it 
                                                
32 Yahil, 41. 
33 Beretning til Folketinget, Afgivet af den af Tinget Under 19. Dec. 1945 Nedsatte 
Kommission i Henhold til Grundlovens [section] 45, bilag XII (København: J.H. Schultz A/S, 
Universitets-Bogtrykkeri, 1946), 216, quoted in Yahil, 42. 
 15 
 
would be in Germany’s best interests to wait until after the final victory to address the 
Jewish question in Denmark.  Otherwise, they would be jeopardizing the collaborative 
relationship achieved so far.  His remark that the enrollment of Danish volunteers for the 
Waffen-SS would not succeed if the Jews were to be persecuted particularly impressed 
Himmler.34  The following year, Renthe-Fink remarked “If it transpires that Germany can 
in fact force Denmark to elevate the Jewish question to its current agenda, it should be 
acknowledged that Denmark can no longer follow the path it has taken so far.”35  This 
meant that, if the Nazis were to impose any anti-Semitic measures, the Danish 
government and people would cease to cooperate as they had been doing.  He went on to 
say, “In my opinion, we would do best not to intervene in this internal political 
controversy, which will bring the Jewish problem to the Danish public consciousness 
more intensively than ever before.  Instead, we should continue to follow the line we 
have pursued thus far.”36  
However, as time went on, tensions on both sides began to rise.  From 1940 to 
1943, Danish politicians maintained a passive negotiation policy in order to avoid open 
confrontation with the Germans.  But the preferential treatment the Danes received made 
them feel trapped as if they were “the canary bird of a murderer.”37  According to 
historian and journalist, Joachim Joesten, being a part of the German war effort was an 
unpleasant situation for the Danes as “the Scandinavian peoples are, as everybody knows, 
pacifists to the core.  There is nothing they dislike more heartily than martial airs and 
bellicose gestures like the goosestep.  But they passionately love freedom and 
                                                
34 Yahil, 54. 
35 Cecil von Renthe-Fink, "First Public Discussion of the Jewish Question in Occupied 
Denmark," As cited in Yad Vashem Archives JM/2503. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Leistikow, 345. 
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independence.”38  The German occupation and the economic consequences of war were 
taking their toll on the Danish people.  The Nazi government was also feeling additional 
pressure.  Germany soon found itself facing new enemies – the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  It was also suffering devastating losses on the battlefield, in contrast to its 
earlier victories.  It became more dependent on the economic and military assistance of 
their occupied countries and “slowly removed its velvet gloves” in Denmark.39  As a 
result, the Danes began to experience a tougher occupying administration.   
Until 1942, the Danish government and its citizens had dealt with their German 
occupiers through means of negotiation and accommodation but the rising tensions gave 
way to more obvious forms of opposition.  The spirit and opinion of the Danish people at 
this time could be observed at the May 1942 funeral of their popular Prime Minister, 
Thorvald Stauning.  The funeral was held in the largest hall existing in Copenhagen at the 
time – Forum Hall – and was attended by over 8,000 people.  As the crowds waited for 
King Christian X to arrive, a movement was detected by the entrance.  Thinking it was 
the king, the people stood but it was only Renthe-Fink who entered.  Of the event, Danish 
politician Hartvig Frisch wrote, “It is impossible to describe with what speed the people 
sat down again, and as the hall was large the movement was like a ripple and became a 
unique demonstration of silence.”40  When the king finally arrived, he ignored the 
saluting Germans and warmly greeted the Danish crowd.   
Problems between the two countries continued into the summer.  Small resistance 
groups that were not only opposed to the Nazis but also the collaboration policy their 
                                                
38 Joesten, 721. 
39 Hollander, 50. 
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government accepted began to take action.  The illegal Communist Party of Denmark 
organized a resistance movement of “sabotage cells” mostly made up of veterans from 
anti-Franco brigades of the Spanish Civil War.41  These cells were known as Borgerlige 
Partisaner (Civil Partisans) or BOPA, and used gasoline and matches to carry out their 
operations.  Another resistance group that received much attention at the time was 
comprised of teenage schoolboys who called themselves the “Churchill Club.”  This 
group of teenagers carried out arson attacks and stole German weapons.  Although the 
Danish police caught them in May 1942, two of the boys would manage to escape and 
continue their resistance efforts at night before returning to their cells for the day.  After 
escaping 19 times, the two boys were caught by German soldiers and put before a 
German court martial.  They were sentenced to 10 to 15 years in German prisons, as their 
ability to escape was “perceived by the occupying power as an example of Danish 
negligence in the face of sabotage.”42  By 1942, resistance groups also began to receive 
help from Great Britain, which trained members of the Danish underground in Britain 
and parachuted back into Denmark with additional arms and explosives.  The number and 
effectiveness of sabotages greatly increased with the help of their foreign allies.43   
The relationship between Denmark and Germany reached a turning-point in the 
early fall during a diplomatic crisis known as “The Telegram Incident.”  On the occasion 
of Denmark’s King Christian X’s 72nd birthday on September 26, 1942, Hitler sent a 
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warm note congratulating the king.  In response, Hitler received a telegram that simply 
said, “MY UTMOST THANKS, CHRISTIAN REX.”44  Although the actual German text 
(“SPRECHE MEINEN BESTEN DANK AUS”) was no different than his replies from 
previous years, Hitler went into a rage.45  With the encouragement of some of his 
advisors in Berlin, Hitler adopted the idea that Denmark had become too defiant and 
uncooperative in its role as a protectorate.  According to several German officials, such as 
Gestapo senior official Rudolf Mildner, “And ever since then Hitler hated Denmark.”46  
Ribbentrop ordered Renthe-Fink to deliver a message of protest to the Danish 
government on September 29 and recalled him immediately back to Berlin.  The Danish 
envoy stationed in Berlin was also requested to return to Copenhagen.47  The cordial 
diplomatic relationship between the two countries was shaken. 
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Chapter III 
 
“I gather a situation that must be characterized as critical has arisen because 
of the somewhat lax and feeble manner in which the Danes were handled by the 
Reich's Plenipotentiary, Dr. Best”48 
 
The riots and increased tensions in Denmark called for some changes in its Nazi 
representatives.  The Germans pressured the Danish government to remove Prime 
Minister Vilhelm Buhl, the Social Democrat who succeeded Thorvald Stauning, and 
installed the pro-German Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius in his place.  The commander 
of the German military in Denmark, General Erich Ludke, was seen as too lenient and 
was replaced by General Hermann von Hanneken, whose job was to take a tougher stance 
on the Danish resistance movement.49  Renthe-Fink was also replaced with SS-
Obergruppenführer Werner Best, who was personally handpicked by Heinrich Himmler 
in November 1942 to be the new plenipotentiary.50  Best’s role in the failed deportations 
is significant but his motives and actions are unclear and often called into question.   
Dr. Karl Rudolf Werner Best was an ambitious man.  Born in 1903, he earned a 
doctorate in law from the University of Heidelberg in 1927 and became a judge in 1929 
in the Hessian court.  He was fired in December 1931 for his connection to the Boxheim 
Documents, which were part of a failed effort to overthrow the Weimar Republic.51  In 
1930, he joined the Nazi Party and worked closely with SS-Reichsführer Himmler and 
the head of the security police, Reinhard Heydrich.  He worked his way up to a few 
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senior positions in the Gestapo, eventually serving as head of the Administration and Law 
department of the Reich Main Security Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt or RSHA).52  
In this capacity, “Both Himmler and Heydrich relied on Best to develop the legalities of 
their actions against the enemies of the state and the Jewish problem.”53  Best was sent to 
Paris in 1940 where he was appointed head of the civilian administration of the German 
Military Command and issued Judenverordnung (Jews Regulations), which initiated 
strict regulations on Jewish citizens and deportations to detention camps and then to 
Auschwitz.54  It was in France that Best earned the nickname, “Bloodhound of Paris.”55  
Best arrived in Denmark on November 5, 1942 after being reassigned in late 
October.  According to Best, he was transferred to Denmark because of the political 
instability after King Christian X’s telegram to Hitler, which was not well received.56  
Before he left, Best met with Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Renthe-Fink to discuss the current 
situation of the German occupation in Denmark.  At this meeting, Hitler told him to keep 
relations between the two countries as peaceful as possible and that his goal was to 
establish a new, legal government.  In an interview after the war, Best claimed that it was 
his “absolute intention…in accordance with his views on the relations between Germany 
and the occupied countries, to conduct a considerate policy of agreements, even though 
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he might come in conflict with the general wishes of the German National-socialist [sic] 
Party.”57  If true, this statement might account for the tactics he took in running his 
occupying administration and his actions during the fall of 1943.      
Like Renthe-Fink, Best maintained a passive approach in governing Denmark.  
His superior, Ribbentrop, remained indifferent to and possibly supported his methods, 
even though they both received pressure from other leading Nazi officials, such as 
Himmler and SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann, to change their policy.58  Also 
like his predecessor, Best was not eager to confront the Jewish question in Denmark.  He 
reasserted Renthe-Fink’s belief that “Danish society regards the Jewish question above 
all as a legal and constitutional issue.  If the German side were to demand special 
treatment of certain Danish citizens – that is, Jews who hold Danish citizenship – the 
Danes would regard this above all as an assault on their constitution.”59  The Germans 
would only face more resistance from the Danish people if actions against the Jews were 
taken.  Furthermore, Best said:  
The Jewish problem commands so little importance in Denmark, in terms of 
quantity and interest, that there is no practical need to take special action for the 
time being… it may be stated that neither political nor economic behavior in 
Denmark is substantively influenced by Jews; that German interests do not 
require measures against the Jews in Denmark at the present time; that since the 
Jews in Denmark are so few and so unimportant, summary actions against them 
would seem unfounded and incomprehensible.60 
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In Best’s opinion, the Jewish situation in Denmark was not a threat to German interests.  
Instead of creating unnecessary political unrest and further straining Danish-German 
relations, action against the Danish Jews could wait for the time being.   
However, the new German administration did not successfully eliminate the acts 
of sabotage in Denmark; in fact, the amount of sabotage increased in 1943 and became 
more organized.  In Best’s opinion, these instances of sabotage were only an effort to 
disrupt his authority in Denmark in order to force political change and were of no 
importance to the German war effort.61  In a May 1943 report to Berlin, Best called recent 
events a “Sabotage Wave” (Sabotagewelle) and claimed that the Danish police were 
“energetically and successfully” fighting the problem.62  But this was not the case.  
Resistance had continued to grow throughout the year and reached a breaking point in the 
summer.  While there were a recorded number of 120 acts of sabotage for the entire year 
of 1942, there were 181 in the second quarter of 1943 and 185 in August 1943 alone.63  
After a set of German military defeats – particularly the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 
1943 – and a break in Swedish-German relations, the Danish people became more 
defiant.  In August, Danish dock workers in Odense (the third largest city in Denmark) 
refused to repair German ships and went on strike, which sparked more strikes, riots, and 
acts of sabotage throughout the country.64  Later that same month, Danish resistance 
members blew up Forum Hall, which was to be converted into barracks for the German 
                                                
61 “Interrogation of the Former Commissioner of the German Reich in Denmark, Dr. 
Werner Best, in the Castel Copenhagen, 3 August 1945” in Nuremberg, Germany: International 
Military Tribunal, 1945-08-03 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Law Library’s Donovan 
Nuremberg Trial Collection), 1. 
62 Hollander, 52. 
63 Gunnar S. Paulsson, "The 'Bridge over the over the ∅resund’: The Historiography on 
the Expulsion of the Jews from Nazi-Occupied Denmark," Journal of Contemporary History 30, 
no. 3 (1995): 446. 
64 Hollander, 52. 
 23 
 
Army.65 German officials in Denmark were finding it more and more difficult to control 
the Danish population.  
Throughout the month of August, General von Hanneken, who did not get along 
with Best, sent numerous reports to Berlin about the increasing unrest in Denmark.  In his 
accounts he “characterized Denmark as a country on the edge of revolt” and called for 
harsher measures to be taken against saboteurs.66  Hitler and his Foreign Ministry were 
appalled by the situation von Hanneken described.  On August 24, Best was summoned 
to meet Ribbentrop at Hitler’s Wolf Lair in East Prussia.  In a journal entry made on 
September 8, 1943, the Reich’s Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels said, “I gather a 
situation that must be characterized as critical has arisen because of the somewhat lax and 
feeble manner in which the Danes were handled by the Reich's Plenipotentiary, Dr. Best. 
The Danes put a wrong interpretation on the generous treatment accorded them.”67  He 
also recalled Best’s visit to Hitler’s headquarters an “an energetic dressing down” for 
how the situation was being handled in Denmark.68  Goebbels, as well as many other 
Nazi officials, concluded that the preferential treatment shown to Denmark had not been 
repaid and the Danes had misused Germany’s generosity. 
According to Best, Ribbentrop reprimanded him for the stressful situation in 
Denmark and told him that Hitler had sided with General von Hanneken.  Best was 
denied the opportunity to speak personally with Hitler on the matter, as Ribbentrop would 
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“in no way oppose Hitler, if he was excited about something.”69  Although he protested, 
Best was sent back to Copenhagen with an ultimatum, which was presented to the Danish 
government on August 28. 
Germany’s ultimatum for Denmark consisted of several things.  The first was the 
implementation of a state of emergency.  In the state of emergency, public meetings of 
more than five people were to be prohibited, as well as any form of strike or support for 
strikers.  The press would be censored under German control and all weapons had to be 
surrendered.  A curfew between the hours of 8:30 pm and 5:30 am would be established 
and enforced.  Most distressing were the demands for the implementation of the death 
penalty and for saboteurs and Danes accused of other violations to be tried by German 
courts.70  The Danish government unanimously rejected the proposal and stepped down.  
On August 29, German authorities declared martial law and a state of emergency was 
imposed.  Telephone lines were cut, prominent Danish figures – including professors, 
businessmen, writers, members of parliament, and leaders of the Jewish community – 
were taken as hostages, and the Danish military was disarmed.  The previous policies of 
collaboration and negotiation were over. 
In September, German plans for a mass deportation of Danish Jews were made.  
Reports and theories of who actually initiated the action vary but on September 8, Best 
sent Telegram 1032 to Ribbentrop’s Foreign Ministry in Berlin, which stated: 
I hereby beg, in light of the new situation, to report on the Jewish problem in 
Denmark as follows: In accordance with the consistent application of the new 
policy in Denmark, it is my opinion that measures should now be taken toward a 
solution of the problems of the Jews and the Freemasons. The necessary steps 
should be taken as long as the present state of emergency exists, for afterward 
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they will be liable to cause reaction in the country, which in turn may lead to a 
reimposition [sic] of a general state of emergency under conditions which will 
presumably be less convenient than those of today.71  
 
For the Freemasons, Best only suggested closing their lodges, arresting prominent 
leaders, and confiscating property but for the Jews, he asked for additional ships and 
police forces to help arrest and deport them.72  According to Richard Petrow, “The 
telegram was a masterpiece of bureaucratic infighting.”73  In sending this report, Best 
helped repair his ideological standing with Hitler and Himmler as he now was finally 
willing to address the Danish Jewish question to their liking.  In addition, the new police 
forces requested, as well as some of General von Hanneken’s military forces, would be 
placed under his control: the move was a small victory in the competition between the 
two men.  Hitler gave his approval nine days later on September 17. 
Plans and preparations for the mass deportation quickly came together throughout 
the month.  The police forces Best requested started arriving, even before Hitler’s official 
approval came through.  SS-Sturmbannführer Karl Heinz Hoffman, who was assigned as 
head of the Gestapo in Denmark, was the first to arrive on September 14.  Hoffman, with 
Best’s approval, immediately went to work and conducted a raid on Copenhagen’s 
Jewish community offices and confiscated their membership lists. The first contingents of 
the Orpo (Ordnungspolizei or Regular Order Police) and SiPo (Sicherheitspolizei or 
Security Police) arrived on September 15 and their commander, SS-Standartenführer 
Rudolf Mildner, on the 17th.74  
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After Hitler’s approval was received, the arrests and deportations were scheduled 
for the night of October 1, the first night of the Jewish New Year and when most of the 
Danish Jews were expected to be at home.  In a telegram sent to Ribbentrop on the 
morning of the arrests, Best explained his plan for that evening: the Jews would be 
arrested during the night of October 1-2 and transported by ship from Sjælland (the 
Danish island on which Copenhagen is located) and by “special trains” from the Danish 
peninsula, Jutland; no mention of the actions would be made in the press or over the 
radio; Jewish property would not be confiscated “so that the taking away of these assets 
cannot be described as the primary or subsidiary object of the action”; and an 
announcement would be made a few days after about releasing interned Danish soldiers 
to “show that the Germans do not intend, as has already been contended here, to put the 
Danish peasant boys on the same footing as the Jews.”75 The Danish Jews would then be 
transported to the Theresienstadt concentration camp in Czechoslovakia.  
Despite having sent Telegram 1032, Best was apprehensive about the 
deportations.  In a later interview, Best said he protested the actions because it would 
cause trouble for Germany in Denmark and their relations to Sweden but was told to go 
forward with the actions as planned.  Instead, “The subject [Best] took a decision to enter 
into the matter in such a way that the persecution could be undertaken in the minimum 
proportions.”76  He knew that the roundups would cause outrage among the Danish 
people.  To try to minimize Danish reprisals, the arrests were deliberately planned to take 
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place during the night, as most would learn about the night’s events the following 
morning when the operation would be over.77  He mentioned in his telegram on October 1 
that Jewish property would not be confiscated and Danish soldiers would be released: all 
measures to placate the Danish people after the arrests.  Most telling were the orders 
given to the police, which said that they were not allowed to break down the doors of 
Jewish citizens; the police needed to knock and if no one answered, they had to leave 
peacefully.  One Jewish family was spared because they were asleep and did not hear the 
knocking on the door; they only found out about the arrests the following morning.78   
Most likely his biggest concern was the effect the operation would have on his 
career.  In his ambition to regain favor with the Nazi elite, he made a risky move.  By 
offering to implement a plan for a “Final Solution” in Denmark, he had started to earn 
back trust with Hitler and Himmler, his former mentor, and temporarily had the upper 
hand over General von Hanneken.  However, he knew that if the operation were to fail, it 
would mean forfeiting his power, almost certainly to his rival, and losing any chance to 
advance his career.  For Best, it might be better if the deportations did not happen at all.  
Other German officials had their doubts as well.  When Best’s rival, General von 
Hanneken, was told about the deportations on September 20, he quickly sent a telegram 
to General Staff headquarters about his concerns.  He worried about how the operation 
would affect the military, calling it “a heavy burden” as he believed the police force 
could not handle the job alone and the army’s strength would be divided between the 
action in Copenhagen and training new recruits elsewhere.79  Furthermore, he said:  
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The benefits of the deportation strike me as doubtful.  No cooperation can be 
expected afterward from the civil administration or from the Danish police.  The 
supply of food will be adversely affected.  The “willingness to supply” of the 
armaments industry will be undermined.  Disturbances requiring use of military 
force must be expected.80 
 
He saw clear and serious ramifications that would result from the deportations and none 
of them were positive for the German military or Foreign Ministry. 
Even one of the new arrivals in Copenhagen saw the harm that would come from 
such action.  Mildner had come to Denmark from Katowice, Poland where he was known 
as the tough Gestapo chief who sent many to Auschwitz.  According to historian Timothy 
Snyder, “In other words, he was hardly a man without experience in the mass murder of 
Jews.”81  However, what he found in Copenhagen was much different than what he saw 
in his past experiences in East Europe.  The Danes still maintained many institutions that 
had been eliminated further east including active political parties, a sovereign state, and a 
native police force that would not cooperate with the occupier’s plans.  The effectiveness 
of a “Final Solution” that had been achieved in the east would not be easy to come by in 
Denmark, if at all.82  When he received the order for the deportations, Mildner was “very 
distressed” and made his concerns known to Best and his superiors in Berlin.83  With 
Best’s permission, he sent a telegram to Gestapo Chief Heinrich Mueller requesting for 
the operations to be cancelled, his reasons being that the Jews were causing no problems, 
there would be serious consequences for the German-Danish relationship, and it would 
lead to more riots and sabotage.84  His telegram was answered by a message from 
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Himmler through the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, which 
said the actions were to be carried out.  He even flew to Berlin to meet with 
Kaltenbrunner with the sole purpose of changing his mind but had no success; as 
Kaltenbrunner was unavailable, he met with Mueller who wrote a telegram to Himmler at 
Mildner’s request.  When he returned to Copenhagen, Mildner received a direct order 
from Himmler, again through Kaltenbrunner, which said, “The anti-Jewish actions are to 
be started immediately.”85 
On September 23, Ribbentrop sent a memorandum to Hitler reiterating Best’s 
apprehensions for the action.  He brought up the concerns about the Danish political 
situation, the likely possibility that a new government could be formed, the assumed riots 
and strikes that would follow, and that the King and Danish parliament would cease to 
cooperate.  Ribbentrop asked, “Having taken into account the considerations of the Reich 
Minister in Denmark, I hereby request an instruction.  Does the Fuehrer want the action 
against the Jews to be carried out now?”86  Hitler could not be swayed.  In the margins of 
the received message was the note,  “The Fuehrer doubts that the action will lead to these 
conclusions” initialed by Walter Hewel, the Representative of the Foreign Ministry at 
Hitler’s headquarters.87  The arrests and deportations would continue as planned.  
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Chapter IV 
 
“So, for God’s sake, don’t stay at home.”88 
 
Although Berlin commanded that the operation be continued as planned, Best had 
one more card to play.  In a meeting between Best, Mildner, and the plenipotentiary’s 
deputy and old friend, SS-Brigadeführer Paul Kanstein, who would later be involved in 
the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler as the would-be new head of the 
German security police, it was decided that a warning should be issued to the Jewish 
community.89  This warning would be “leaked” by Best’s confidant, Georg Ferdinand 
Duckwitz.   
Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz is a celebrated figure in Holocaust resistance and has 
been recognized as one of the “Righteous Among the Nations” by Yad Vashem since 
1971.90  He was born in Bremen, Germany in 1904 and became involved in the 
international coffee trade after college, spending much time in Scadinavia.  He joined the 
Nazi Party in 1932 but later drifted away from the movement.  However, in 1939 the 
Foreign Ministry appointed him the German maritime attaché stationed in Copenhagen, 
responsible for coordinating commercial shipping between the two countries.91  As he 
had previously worked in Denmark before the war, his knowledge of Danish affairs and 
their language made him a valuable asset.  When Best arrived in Denmark in late 1942, 
he and Duckwitz soon became good friends.  Their families were known to socialize 
privately and Best trusted Duckwitz’s counsel on Danish affairs.  Duckwitz served as a 
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confidant to Best, who clearly valued his friend’s judgment, which is why he chose to 
confide in him about the deportations.   
The details of exactly when Duckwitz first heard of the operation and what he did 
afterwards are unclear.  Most historians believe Duckwitz’s account that he learned about 
Telegram 1032 three days after it was sent (September 11) and flew to Berlin to try to 
intercept it but when he arrived on the 13th, it was too late.  It is also widely accepted that 
in order to negotiate for foreign aide from Sweden, Duckwitz travelled to Stockholm on 
September 22 and met with a friend, Nils Ekblad, an official of the Swedish Embassy in 
Copenhagen who was in Stockholm at the time, and was introduced to the Swedish Prime 
Minister.  However, historian Gunnar Paulsson claims that both accounts are untrue, as 
they do not correspond to other factual timelines and accounts.  According to Paulsson, 
Telegram 1032 only arrived at its intended recipient – Ribbentrop – on September 13 and 
was not forwarded to Hitler until the 16th, which he claims was also the first day recorded 
in Best’s diary that mentioned meeting with Duckwitz during this time period.92 Paulsson 
argues that either the flight did not happen, that it took place later than claimed, or that 
the visit pertained to an entirely different matter.93  In regards to whether Duckwitz ever 
contacted the Swedes, Paulsson puts more faith in Ekblad’s version of the events, in 
which he claimed Duckwitz met him in Copenhagen on September 28 and that Ekblad 
put him in contact not with the Swedish Prime Minister but the Danish Prime Minister.  
Duckwitz’s visa records at the Swedish Foreign Ministry also indicate that he was not in 
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Sweden at any point during this time period.94  Paulsson believes that Ekblad’s story, 
although not entirely credible – for example, Duckwitz had his own contacts in the 
Danish government and did not need Ekblad’s introduction – is more plausible.  It would 
explain why it took so long for the Swedish government to take action on information 
that it supposedly received on the 22nd, and refutes the implication that the Swedish 
Prime Minister would accept the word of “a junior official of a German embassy in a 
foreign country who had no standing in Sweden.”95  However, Sweden did announce in 
early October that it would take in all Danish Jewish refugees.  
Regardless of exact dates, Duckwitz was told of the upcoming deportations and 
met with Swedish officials at some point to arrange a place of refuge for Danish Jews.  
On Tuesday, September 28, Best told him that the mass deportations had a confirmed 
date for the night of October 1-2.  He quickly disclosed this to Danish Social Democratic 
leaders, Hans Hedtoft and H.C. Hansen, who immediately shared the information with 
leaders of the Jewish community.96  One such leader was the acting chief rabbi of 
Denmark, Rabbi Marcus Melchior, who received a visitor that night with a message.  
According to his son, Rabbi Bent Melchior: 
The message was, “The Jews should not stay home on Friday night.  Whether it 
would possible… later to return, we don’t know.  The Germans here in Denmark 
are in fact against this decision but it is an order from Berlin and we can’t do 
nothing about it and it has to be done and the Gestapo will be here to arrest the 
Jews.  So, for God’s sake, don’t stay at home.”97 
 
                                                
94 UMA, Viseringar, Duckwitz, Georg Ferdinand and Annemarie, quoted in Paulsson, 
451-452. 
95 Paulsson, 452. 
96 Barford, 13. 
97 Rabbi Bent Melchior, interview by Judith Goldstein. 
 33 
 
Although the action was to take place three days later, Rabbi Melchior had to make the 
best decision about when to share the news.  He received the information just minutes 
before curfew began and therefore could not go out or use the telephone:   
So the first chance to spread the news was on the Wednesday morning.  Now that 
Wednesday was the eve of Rosh Hashanah of the Jewish New Year.  And there is 
a very early service in synagogues – in orthodox synagogues – where you say 
special prayers and where there are to be more people than on usual, on normal 
weekdays.  So my father stopped those services in the synagogue of 
Copenhagen… in the middle of the services… and told the people what he had 
been told the night before.98 
 
He told his congregation about the planned roundup, asked them to spread the news to 
everyone, and urged them to go into hiding.   
Rescue efforts had little organization at first and relied on the spontaneous and 
generous action of non-Jewish Danes.99  Contacting Jews in the Danish community 
proved to be a problem at times because, as Pundik recalled, “There was no general 
awareness in Denmark of who was or was not Jewish.  Many were surprised to discover 
that the people next door were Jews, for some Jews had tried so hard to forget their origin 
that they had nearly succeeded.”100  Although delivering warnings was not always easy, 
most Jews were able to leave their homes quickly and continued to pass on the warning 
as they left.  During the next several weeks, friends, colleagues, and even strangers 
assisted the majority of the Danish Jews.  Rabbi Marcus Melchior’s family spread the 
news that they were going into the country for a vacation; according to his son, Rabbi 
Bent Melchior, “And people knew that if the rabbi goes into the country on Rosh 
Hashanah, it is like Father Christmas leaving before December.  And that was some of 
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the ways we used to get the message around.”101  Many found hiding spaces within hours 
and “All found a place to sleep and were given food; offers of payment were usually 
refused”.102  The home of Dr. Jørgen Gersfelt became one of the main channels in this 
operation and his services extended past being just a safe-home.  As a doctor, Gersfelt 
was allowed to drive at night during curfew and would use this privilege to take Jewish 
citizens that had been hidden in his home to their departure points on the coast.  He 
would also make sure that the transportations could be paid for and that all passengers on 
board would remain quiet.  Pundik explained: 
The fishermen would tell him how many people they could take each night and 
how much it would cost.  Gersfelt manipulated the passenger lists so that affluent 
refugees would pay for the indigent.  He made young children drink an anesthetic 
so they would not cry and wake up the Germans, and he injected adults with a 
tranquilizer.  In most cases, Gersfelt relates, it was the adults, of all people, who 
displayed the most fear.103  
 
Local institutions also offered shelter.  Schools welcomed refugees but could not remain 
open for a long period of time or they would draw attention.  Hospitals, especially the 
Copenhagen hospital, Bispebjerg, became a center for a great number of refugees, many 
of whom were hidden under Christian names.104  Several priests from a church near the 
Copenhagen synagogue, concerned that Nazis might try to destroy its sacred scrolls, 
broke into the synagogue, took the scrolls, and hid them in the basement of their church 
for the remainder of the war.105 
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An additional factor in acting out this grand rescue was acquiring the needed 
finances.  Jews hiding in the city were being quickly and quietly moved to hiding places 
along the northern coast where they would wait for fishermen to take them over to 
Sweden.  Fishing boats filled with refugees left fishing ports constantly, some fishermen 
making the trip several times a day.  Fishermen often took advantage of the desperate 
need for transportation and perceived dangers to charge fees that “rose and fell with the 
pressure of refugees and that the price per transport greatly surpassed the value of a 
fishing boat”.106  Transportation at first was carried out on a private basis, making this 
option of escape available to the few that had the necessary means of payment.  The 
majority of Jewish citizens had to sell possessions in order to obtain the money needed.  
Some fishermen made the trips free of cost or refused extra payment in addition to their 
original fees.  The Jewish Community’s Board of Trustees, which was already in 
Sweden, allowed the assets of the community to be used as collateral and a loan of 
750,000 kroner was given and paid back by the community after the war.107  Some 
Danish organizations and wealthier private citizens covered most other expenses. 
During this time, discovery was always a possible threat in the forefront of the 
minds of all involved.  However, the majority of evidence indicates that the Germans did 
not put up much of a fight.  Yahil claims, "The general opinion is that the Danish Nazis - 
few though they were - were more dangerous than the Germans themselves."108  The 
majority of the police that were carrying out the operation were not Gestapo but the 
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Orpo’s “over-age reservists” aided by some Danish officers.109  As previously mentioned, 
these men were under orders to leave peacefully if no one answered the knocks on their 
door and although there were a few who disregarded the instructions, the majority 
complied.  While the German army was called in to help carry out the deportations, the 
soldiers were not enthusiastic.  Dr. Gersfelt recalled an instance when a garbage truck 
hiding several Jews was stopped by an army patrol.  When they lifted the lid of the truck 
and saw the hidden people, one of them exclaimed, "Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," 
dropped the lid, and motioned for the truck driver to continue.110  According to many 
Danish survivors, most German soldiers were willing to accept bribes or turn a blind eye.  
Countless stories of Jewish families travelling to the coast by train corroborate that the 
train-cars were full of German soldiers who pretended not to see their fellow passengers.  
Some of these soldiers even took advantage of the rescues as a way to desert to Sweden: 
one story claims that on October 12, the German consul stationed in the German port of 
Malmö reported that six German soldiers had disguised themselves as fishermen, 
participated in transporting Danish Jews to Sweden, and then stayed there.111  
The Germans were also not very present in the water, although they knew there 
was a “very lively traffic” of fishing boats going back and forth between Denmark and 
Sweden.112  In such a dramatic and tense situation as the rescues, it would be easy to 
imagine the Øresund, the strait between Denmark and Sweden, to be filled with German 
ships waiting to catch the Jews and those who helped them.  However, this was not the 
case.  Only one ship, the Wartheland, was sent for the deportations and remained 
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anchored in the Copenhagen harbor at the time.113  The German naval commander for the 
port in Copenhagen had decided that this would be a good time to send his entire fleet of 
patrol boats in for repairs.114  The inactivity of the Germans – on land and at sea – made it 
much easier for the rescue attempts to succeed.  The numbers vary slightly, but most 
agree that within a few weeks about 7,000 Jews were transported to Sweden and kept out 
of danger. 
The success of the Danish rescue most often overshadows the losses experienced 
at the time.  One of the few failed rescues was a transport from Gilleleje, a small fishing 
port in North Zeeland.  In the first stages of the rescue, the trips to Sweden could be 
easily kept secret.  However, as more people came and waited to be transported, the 
growing interest in the small harbor caught the attention of the Gestapo.  On October 5, 
the Gestapo chief and a few subordinates arrived and stopped a group of about twenty 
Jews from leaving by shooting the ship’s skipper and easily taking the passengers.  The 
next day, even more arrests were made.  Around five hundred Jews were hiding in 
Gilleleje, some hiding in the lofts of the town’s church and others in the Mission hall.  
That night, the Gestapo Chief and his men raided the town, capturing the eighty people in 
the church lofts and the twenty hiding in the Mission hall.  All of the refugees and the 
Danes that helped them were caught, taken to the Horserød prison camp in North 
Zeeland, and later to Germany.115  
Out of the estimated 7,500 Jews in Denmark, the number of Jews arrested was 
under five hundred.  Those who were arrested were taken to the Theresienstadt 
concentration camp in Czechoslovakia.  The Danish Red Cross worked on their behalf to 
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ensure their welfare.  They were persistent in knowing their location and living 
conditions and therefore secured better treatment for their imprisoned countrymen.  The 
Danish Red Cross also pressured the Germans to allow the International Red Cross to 
inspect Thereseinstadt. A visit was eventually granted for June 23, 1944 and was 
conducted by a Berlin delegate from the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), Dr. Maurice Rossel, and two representatives of the Danish government and 
Danish Red Cross.116  However, the conditions of the camp are known now to have been 
a great hoax; in preparation for this visit, the Nazis orchestrated a beautification project 
for the camp, which included painting buildings, constructing fake stores, planting 
gardens, and adding better furnishings to the shower area.  The prisoners were also 
threatened that they and their families would be killed if they in any way exposed the 
deception.117  Despite the deceptive tricks, the persistence and amount of Danish protests 
likely kept the imprisoned Danes from being transported to other camps.  According to a 
later interview, Best:  
…heard the complaints in the country that the danish [sic] people were not 
properly treated in concentration camps, - he laid down a complaint to the foreign 
ministry proposing and requiring that the Germans would be transferred to a 
special camp in order that they could [be] properly treated.  As far as the danes 
[sic] were concerned he requested repeatedly that they be transported back to 
Denmark.118  
 
In April 1945, German authorities handed over the Danish prisoners to the Swedish Red 
Cross and virtually all refugees returned to Denmark that year.  Most found their homes 
unoccupied and taken care of by their neighbors.  
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The failed action in Denmark inspired much bitterness directed at both Best and 
Mildner from several high-ranking Nazi officials.  Best, eager to put a positive spin on 
the situation, claimed that the goal of the operation was to get rid of the Jews in Denmark 
and so their plan to make Denmark Judenrein was actually successful.119  But the powers 
in Berlin were not so easily fooled.  According to Mildner, “There was big excitement in 
the Führer’s headquarters.  Hitler and Himmler were furious… They assumed correctly 
that the Jews had been warned.”120   
Despite the reactions from Berlin, there is no evidence that indicates that either 
man was harshly penalized for this outcome.  Both men had worked to put an end to the 
plans being made throughout September and the night of the deportations showed 
obvious signs of their interference.  Best especially had actively participated in 
sabotaging German efforts by leaking information and ordering a more passive approach 
to searching for and arresting the Danish Jews.  His actions anywhere else would have 
resulted in death.  The lack of response from Berlin regarding the failed deportations 
suggests that Nazi leadership was perhaps happy to settle for a Judenrein Denmark, 
regardless of how it was achieved.  However, although he was not reprimanded for the 
outcome of the events in October, Mildner would be transferred to Kassel, Germany a 
few months later in January 1944 for not agreeing to German retaliation plans in response 
to subsequent acts of sabotage in Denmark.  
In Denmark, the Danes did not experience much backlash from the occupying 
Germans regarding the failed deportations.  Paulsson claims, “Whatever fears the Danes 
may have entertained, in reality no Dane was executed, sent to a concentration camp, or 
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long imprisoned for helping Jews.”121  The few that the German police had arrested were 
turned over to the Danish authorities.  Their fellow Danes would then let them go after 
paying a small fine or by letting them escape.  In addition, those who publicly protested 
the deportations were not punished, even though they did so in violation of the rules of 
the state of emergency.  For example, the German authorities in Denmark ignored a 
group of Danish students and professors who protested the anti-Jewish action during the 
week of October 3-10, 1943.122  In comparison, resistance efforts in the Netherlands were 
met with dramatically different results: when Dutch students protested the dismissal of 
Jewish professors in November 1940, two universities were closed and one professor was 
arrested.123  It was only after an increased amount of sabotage perpetrated by the Danes 
after the failed deportations that the occupying Germans considered reprisals.  Even after 
their now-famous act of defiance, Denmark still received preferential treatment.   
The outcome of Germany’s plan for the deportation of the Danish Jews was, by 
all means, a disaster.  With only three days notice, the Danish citizens of Copenhagen 
managed to save about 7,000 of Denmark’s estimated Jewish population of 7,500 from a 
plan that took a month to coordinate.  This failed mission and the rescue efforts behind it 
made the country of Denmark a rarity in Nazi-occupied Europe. 
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Chapter V 
 
“Some devious political purpose… [that was] never seriously meant to 
succeed.”124   
 
The Danish rescue efforts helped to elevate the perception of Denmark in the 
global Jewish community.  At the end of the war, less than 200 of the estimated 7,000 
Danish Jews were killed in the Holocaust.  This total represents one of the highest 
survival rates for a German-occupied country.125  The rescue marked one of the greatest 
victories against the goal of the Final Solution and caused serious frustration for a 
number of authorities in Berlin.  It also served as a model for Danish human rights and 
international policies in the post-war era.126  The numerous and varied stories of the 
rescue hold images of good and evil in the larger community of a nation.  Though a small 
and defenseless nation, Denmark proved to be a symbol of hope and community in the 
Jewish history of the Holocaust.  
Historians have taken several positions on the case of the Danish rescue during 
the Second World War.  While the actions of many of the Danes were brave, there were 
special circumstances that made the rescue in Denmark easier than most other occupied 
countries in Europe.  The number of Danish Jews was small and largely located in one 
city, and there was a safe haven relatively nearby.  There were also warning signs seen by 
Danish citizens before the information ‘leak’ on September 28.  When Nazi occupiers 
declared a state of emergency on August 29, 1943, it signaled a change in the policy of 
the occupation.  The fate of other Jews throughout the rest of Europe was already well 
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known: for example, Jews from their neighboring country of Norway had been deported 
to Auschwitz in October 1942, one year before the attempted Danish deportation.127  
These conditions made the possibility of a successful rescue more likely as opposed to 
rescue efforts in other countries. 
Another condition that proved helpful to the Danish rescue was the actions – or 
inactions – of the occupying German administration.  Some scholars call this the ‘Good 
Germans’ Theory.  This school of thought promotes the idea that the deportation in 
Denmark was initiated and then deliberately sabotaged by German officials.  It asserts 
that the rescue was “made possible by the fact that accurate advance information about 
the deportations was made available: not leaks or rumours, which might well have been 
disbelieved, but information passed by authoritative German sources to authoritative 
Danish ones, and thence to the Jewish leadership."128  Without the advance warning, the 
rescue would not have been possible and the deportations would have occurred as 
planned.  The Danish Jews might have ignored the warning and not gone into hiding 
allowing the plans to have them arrested and deported proceed, but by that point there 
was enough evidence of Jewish deportations from elsewhere in occupied Europe.  It was 
by running, hiding, and travelling to Sweden that they lived.   
The theory implies that the plans for the arrests and deportation of Danish Jews 
were a charade led by SS-Obergruppenführer Werner Best.  After the war, his 
contemporaries, such as Duckwitz, Mildner, and Ribbentrop, all claimed that Best greatly 
contributed to the success of the Danish rescues.  Former German Envoy of the Reich-
Deputy in Copenhagen, Dr. Paul Barandon, described Best as having the attitude of a 
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lawyer “but he was [also] a very pleasant and honest man with an absolutely faultless 
character.”129  Both he and Best agreed that to keep the steady supply of Danish 
agricultural and labor resources and its shipbuilding industry, they needed to maintain 
Denmark’s cooperation.  Any strong actions taken against Denmark’s Jews would result 
in resistance from the Danish people.  Barandon insinuated that Best opposed the 
deportations as he “had done everything in order to facilitate the emigration of as many 
Jews as possible to Sweden and to mitigate the effect of the action.”130  Ribbentrop later 
claimed that it was Best – and, of course, his own actions – that delayed the deportations 
in Denmark for two years and also credited Best for warning the Danish Jews.131  Mildner 
maintained that although he received the direction to start the deportations through Best, 
the orders originated from Berlin.132  He also received Best’s approval to send the 
telegram requesting the end of the anti-Jewish actions and to fly to Berlin to speak with 
their superiors directly on the subject.  Duckwitz also remained loyal to his friend.  He 
believed that Best was opposed to any action against the Danish Jews and therefore found 
it hard and tragic that he was the one to initiate the deportations.133  
Modern scholars are more divided on the question of Best’s role in the rescue.  
Otto F. Kernberg, a psychiatry professor whose work focuses on personality disorders, 
calls Best “an opportunist who, in order to maintain things smoothly in Denmark, first 
tried to protect the Jews.  However, when he thought the German army was about to 
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assume direct control of the government of Denmark, he tried to maintain his own power 
with the support of Himmler."134  Under this theory, Best had no objection to whether or 
not the deportations took place, as long as he was on the winning side.  For some, like 
Danish historian Hans Kirchhoff, Best initiated the plans for deportation because he 
believed that it would happen regardless after the state of emergency was declared on 
August 29 and “knowing the SS murder machine intimately, he preferred to act as the 
initiator."135  He could better control the outcome of the operation – and its effect on his 
career – if he placed himself in control from the very beginning.  Gunnar Paulsson claims 
that Best’s plan was part of “some devious political purpose but never seriously meant to 
succeed.  And this was perfectly obvious at the time, to those in the know.”136  In this 
scenario, the plans for the operation were just a power-play meant to help Best regain 
favor in Berlin.  This is most likely the case, as the majority of German administrative 
figures stationed in Denmark during the occupation knew that many Danish people would 
meet such actions with greater resistance and the supplies Germany so desperately 
needed from Denmark would be put at greater risk.  
The ‘Good Germans’ Theory also pertains to how the arrests and deportations 
were carried out.  In a later interview, Best claimed that because he had no choice but to 
carry out the plans for the operation, he wanted to make sure it was done with the least 
damage possible and for that reason he decided to share the information about the action 
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with “reliable agents.”137  However, he remembered no other person than Georg 
Duckwitz who was tasked with spreading the information.  Mildner “had no interest that 
any Jews should fall into our hands” and he – the commander of the Orpo and SiPo – 
spent the evening of the roundups with Paul Kanstein instead of acting as a leader and 
supervisor during the arrests.138  His actions clearly show that he did not support the 
operation or wish to see it succeed.  Without passionate leadership, the German soldiers 
and police forces tasked with carrying out the arrests were unlikely to fulfill their 
assignment with much effort.  These men were also under instructions to knock on doors 
and then leave if unanswered; no doors were to be broken down.  Although there were a 
few occasions where the directions were ignored, the fact that such orders were given and 
for the most part followed indicates a unique deviation from standard Nazi practice.139  
Without the Germans breaking down their doors, some Danes were able to sleep through 
the arrests or remain quiet in their houses until they could leave to go into hiding outside 
of the city.  The German soldiers’ willingness to turn a blind eye to the Danes they 
encountered, both the Jews that were hiding and the Danes who helped them, was another 
rare occurrence.  While their motives were probably not aligned to any strong moral 
rationale – it is more likely that the German soldiers were unhappy and unwilling to do 
the work – their decision to purposefully neglect orders greatly benefited the Danish 
Jews.  The Germans’ lax approach to the arrests and deportations in Denmark made the 
rescues much easier for the Danes to accomplish. 
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The Germans in Denmark were “good” because they let the rescues succeed, but 
their intentions were not in defense of the Jews.  None of the men previously mentioned 
were opposed to waiting until after the war to deport the Danish Jews.  They just did not 
want to carry out the action at that time.  Their opposition was politically motivated.  
When studying the events of the Danish occupation, much emphasis is placed on the fact 
that Danes in both government and civilian positions supported their Jewish countrymen, 
long before the war even started.  They did not tolerate prejudice based on religion or 
race.  Members of the German occupation in Denmark knew that any action taken against 
the Danish Jews would lead to severe complications in the “cordial” relationship between 
the two countries.  The German soldiers in Denmark called it the “Whipped Cream” 
Front; it was an easy and pleasant assignment for the older and wounded soldiers 
stationed there.  They knew that the riots, strikes, and other acts of sabotage that would 
likely result from the deportations would make their job of keeping order much harder.   
The German administration knew the operation would put a strain on political relations 
between the countries and Denmark’s cooperation would end.   
These Germans were “good” to let the deportation fail and the rescues succeed, 
but there is little evidence that they did this from the goodness of their hearts.  In fact 
Best was previously known as the “Bloodhound of Paris.”  He was sent to Copenhagen to 
be part of a stricter, more severe German occupation administration.  There was little in 
his history to suggest any particular empathy toward the Jews.  What did change for him 
and other Germans assigned to Copenhagen was the relative ease with which they could 
carry out their assignments there and in turn burnish their careers.  What is much more 
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likely is that these German allowed the deportation to fail in order to preserve the 
comfortable situation they had in Denmark. 
If we acknowledge that the villain of the story was morally ambivalent, does that 
diminish the suffering of the victim?  In the case of Denmark, it does not.  This does not 
lessen the brave actions of the Danish people.  They thought they were in danger.  They 
thought that there would be severe punishment for their defiance.  They had no way of 
knowing that the Germans would be so purposefully ineffectual in their tasks.  To them, 
the Germans posed a real threat.  It is important that history does not forget the terrible 
acts committed by the Nazis nor the suffering of their victims in the Holocaust. However, 
the success stories, and those who helped make them possible, should also be taught, 
remembered, and celebrated. 
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